

28 JUN 1976

NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:




SUBJECT: Highlights of DIA I&W Seminar, 10 June 1976 (attached)

A member of my Staff attended the recent DIA I&W Seminar and recorded Secretary Ellsworth's views on intelligence and the Community. I thought you might find them--as I did--well worth the reading. *interesting.*

cc: D/OPEI



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*Thanks to Mr. [redacted] over [redacted] 7-3-76*

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*Cover Memo to HQ 889325-26*  
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

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14 June 1976  
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM:  PAID

SUBJECT: Highlights of DIA Indications and Warning Seminar, 10 June 1976

1. I thought the most interesting item on the final day's agenda--the only day I attended--was Deputy Secretary of Defense Ellsworth's talk on how one senior consumer/policy maker views intelligence. Here is a summary of his remarks:

-- Five main things contributed to the Pearl Harbor intelligence failure and to a degree they persist today:

- Preconceptions on the part of both the policy maker and the intelligence analyst which limited his thinking, e.g., the assumption that although Japan would go to war, it would be against Britain and not the U.S.
- Lack of communication (inaccessibility) between the policy maker and the intelligence analyst. The policy maker did not share with intelligence what he was going to do (e.g., declaring the scrap iron embargo on Japan) so intelligence could not estimate the possible consequences of his action.
- Failure to think of our forward deployed units as targets instead of deterrents.
- The human tendency to project our own values on the other guy. For example, logic told us that Japan did not have enough resources to go to war for more than six months--therefore, it would not go to war. Japan, however, believed that if it did not go to war it would not be taken seriously as a world power.
- Tendency of both policy maker and intelligence analyst to "drift away from reality" and underestimate the opposing forces--a failure common since the 30s.

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-- From a consumer/policy maker's view these are some of the things wrong with intelligence:

- Too much attention is devoted to producing the intelligence "document" for the consumer and not enough to involving him in the intelligence "process" leading up to it. What does the consumer do while the document is being prepared? His involvement should begin early in the process.
- Intelligence is too "introverted." Too much time is spent coordinating within the Community. It would be better if intelligence established a dialogue with the consumer so the consumer would know what the intelligence analyst has on his mind.
- The "Cry Wolf" syndrome. Intelligence is afraid of being "wrong" because "wrong" is costly. Naturally, there is a trade-off between accuracy and timeliness. As far as he (Ellsworth) is concerned he would sacrifice accuracy for timeliness every time, preferring to get the analysts' judgment calls as quickly as possible. In return, he is prepared to give the Community as "number of false alarms."
- The Community displays too much "jurisdictional zeal" which slows it down and involves it in too many internal disputes. These should be subordinated to the common mission.

-- Ways we can improve:

- Don't "prepackage" the decision for the decision maker and don't wait until you have the "whole" story before telling him anything. Bring him into the intelligence process frequently and as early as possible, point out the possible courses the situation may take and brief him on intelligence's evaluation of the situation as it changes.
- Decision makers should take an active role in the I&W process; involve the Community more in policy making and spend more time with intelligence people so that they can learn and understand the limitations of intelligence.
- In meetings with individual decision makers and operators, intelligence people should speak up more, make themselves heard.

-- Actions DoD has taken:

- Established the Defense Intelligence Board--a new group consisting of both producers and consumers and intended

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to be a "crucible" where both sides are forced into a dialogue. It will meet twice monthly; terms of reference and agenda are now in preparation. It will be a six-month experiment to determine if such an endeavor is useful.

- Established the DKIQs--similar to KIQs but they rely more heavily on the users' suggestions of what they need. DoD intelligence people had to beat the consumer on the head to get him to help but it worked.
- Parting thought--"Competing Centers" of analysis must be retained and encouraged to speak their mind if we are to come up with the best possible product.

2. Other agenda topics included:

- Presentation on Eventualities/Options Approach to Warning Intelligence and Decision Making by [ ] (OASD/ISA). His main premise: Analyze what the target wants to do and what are the motivational pressures and constraints on him to do it. From these develop hypothetical courses of action/deceptions as well as their sequence. Brief the decision maker every step of the way on the evolution of these events. This interaction between decision maker and analyst will help to focus collection efforts and improve warning analysis. Mr. [ ] (SWS) expressed interest in applying this approach to a real situation and seeing how well it would work. It will be an agenda item for the next seminar.

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- [ ] briefed on "Encouraging the Interchange of Operational and Intelligence Information." He focused on [ ] "Decision Stairway" talk describing the interaction process between opposing decision makers. In the ensuing discussion, the issue of whether intelligence had sufficient knowledge of friendly force activities and inventories and, likewise, whether operational forces had adequate intelligence was debated. It was decided that it would be useful to take the subject out of the abstract and get an operator's viewpoint, possibly the J3 for Elegant Eagle. This will be on the agenda for the next seminar.

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- [ ] was unable to attend for his presentation on the final agenda item of the day, "Release of US Intelligence to NATO." But discussion revealed that progress is being made toward several objectives in this area:

- Getting the TK label removed from satellite-derived data.

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- Ensuring that the NATO Staff gets the same I&W data as the U&S Commands.

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


EUCOM will present its draft plan on the subject at the next seminar.

3. In addition to those above, agenda items assigned for the next Seminar were:

- How the phased problem--set approach used in the CCF might be applied to other problems. Action-DIA.
- Issue of Navy Compartmentation limits on the programs. Action-W. Henderson/Admiral Inman.
- Indicators Lists--How they are developed, where they are being used, how useful are they, etc. Action-SWS.
- Status Report on Defense Intelligence Architecture. Action-Henderson.
- Templating: An approach to solving the warning problem. Action-ACSI/DA.
- Tasking of Military Airlift Command through the CCF. Action-DIA.

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- Report on Redundancy in NSA's Power Facilities (the result of the recent NSOC power outage). Action-NSA.
- Distinction between "Warning of War" and "Warning of Attack." Action-British author.
- Progress Report on Special I&W Analysis Project. Action-NSA.

Except for Mr. [redacted] item above, the IC Staff was assigned no agenda topics for the next seminar.

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